Information asymmetry between privately informed investors, interacting with public information transparency, significantly affects trading and learning behaviors, price formation, information revelation, and market efficiency. Private information asymmetryinduced strategic trading behaviors explain the asymmetric U-shape patterns of intraday stock trading volume, return, and volatility. Market depth tends to rise (fall) at market opening (closure) with private information asymmetry increasing. A non-zero degree of private information asymmetry leads to minimal informational trading profit and maximal market efficiency. Disclosure policy should consider its effects on both private information asymmetry and public information transparency in optimizing efficiency and investor protection.
Introduction
The Efficiency Market Hypothesis tells that private information leads to trading profit in semi-strong informationally efficient markets (Fama, 1970 (Fama, , 1998 ). Yet, investors have different incentives and capability in gathering and processing information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Harris and Raviv, 1993) , so it is a fact that investors possessing private information of heterogeneous precision coexist in financial markets. How does private information asymmetry affect trading behaviors? Moreover, information asymmetry induces learning (Veronesi, 1999 (Veronesi, , 2000 Pastor and Veronesi, 2003, 2009) . Learning would improve subsequent trading but ex ante discourage information revelation in the presence of profit competition. How do trading and learning interact? How do they shape price formation and market efficiency?
What are the policy implications on information disclosure and investor protection? We develop a dynamic model featuring investors with private information of heterogeneous precision and endogenous learning to address these intriguing but unexplored questions.
Our model considers two risk-neutral informed investors in a single-risky asset market organized by a risk-neutral market maker. An insider receives a private signal precisely indicating the asset fundamental value. A partially informed investor receives a private signal imprecisely identifying the asset fundamental value. Information asymmetry between informed investors is measured by the degree of imprecision of partially informed investor's private information.
1 Asset value variance reversely captures public information transparency. Insider and partially informed investor exploit their informational advantage in competition. They also learn about the other parties' information conveyed by prices and incorporate learned information in subsequent trading. There are many noise traders trading for non-informational reasons exogenous to the model. In each trading period, all traders simultaneously submit anonymous market orders. Market maker takes on position and sets a uniform price to clear the market. Market making is assumed a perfectly competitive profession, so market maker's profit at the end of each trading period is expected to be zero. The model belongs to the strategic category as informed trades have both transitory and permanent impact on prices (Brunnermeier, 2001; Biais et al., 2005) .
Private information asymmetry significantly shapes trading behaviors. In a unique linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium, informed investors follow time-varying trading strategies. After market opens, partially informed investor substantially increases his order flow to compete for profit when private information asymmetry starts increasing from zero, while insider reduces her order flow to avoid immediate information revelation. When information asymmetry increases beyond a certain degree, insider alters her trading strategy to increase order flow as information asymmetry further enlarges. Meanwhile, partially informed investor reduces his order flow, adding less competition but greater camouflage. Competition leads to active trading after market opening, revealing a large amount of information and moving prices rapidly. Speculative trading reduces informed investors' informational advantage, trading volume gradually recedes and prices move less actively over time. However, before market closes, insider is no longer concerned about preserving information for later trading.
Her order flow increases monotonically with information asymmetry increasing, outpacing partially informed investor's order flow reduction. Active trading of insider leads to rapid price fluctuations before closure.
The results explain the U-shaped patterns of intraday stock trading volume (Jain and Joh, 1988; Chan et al., 1996) , mean return and volatility (Harris, 1986; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997) . High trading volume, return and volatility at market opening and closure are, however, explained by different strategic motives of informed trading. Stronger competition leads to more active trading and price discovery at market opening. No or less need to preserve information before market closure causes rapid increase in trading volume and price movement. Since trading reveals information, trades before closure should have a weaker impact on price formation than at opening, explaining the empirical finding that open-to-open returns are more volatile than close-to-close returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987, 1991) .
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Private information asymmetry time-varyingly affects market informational efficiency.
Within a trading period, information revelation decreases monotonically with information asymmetry increasing. Market depth however rises after market opening but falls before market closure. In the first trading period, when information asymmetry increases from zero, insider withholds private information. Partially informed investor reveals noisy information that hampers price discovery, leading to increase in market depth. When private information asymmetry increases beyond a certain degree, insider reverts to trade aggressively, revealing more private information. Meanwhile, partially informed investor gradually loses his influence on price formation with less trades. Market depth first increases above the level of monopolistic insider as in Kyle (1985) and then falls as private information asymmetry further increases. In the last trading period, market depth decreases convexly with private information asymmetry increasing, but never falls below the level of monopolistic insider as in Kyle (1985) . The results highlight that involvement of partially informed investor in a semi-strong efficient marketplace does not always lead to greater informational efficiency.
Its time-varying impact depends on the dominance of the competition effect or camouflage effect of partially informed trades. The results further imply that per unit increase in stock return and volatility at market opening is accompanied by greater increase in trading volume than at market closure.
Trading profit of informed investors comes at the expense of uninformed investors. When information asymmetry increases from zero, the total expected profit of insider and partially informed investor first decreases from a level of two perfectly competitive insiders as in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and then reverts to increase but never exceeds the level of monopolistic insider as in Kyle (1985) . There exists a non-zero degree of private infor-2 Admati and Pfleiderer (1988, 1989) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1993) theoretically show that liquidity timing can lead to endogenous concentration of trades and price movements. Slezak (1994) develops a market closure model to explain the stylized patterns of time variation in trading and returns. Hong and Wang (2000) propose a competitive model that incorporates both non-informational trades and private information-motivated trades to explain these empirical patterns. mation asymmetry at which informed investors extract the minimal amount of wealth from uninformed investors. This information asymmetry, rather than zero asymmetry, minimizes informational trading profit through balancing competition aggressiveness and information revelation of informed investors, and thus maximizes market efficiency.
The finding has policy implications for information disclosure (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000; Fishman and Hagerty, 2003) and investor protection. Private information asymmetry is more influential in a market with more transparent public information, where private information is more valuable. If information disclosure amplifies the influence of private information asymmetry by increasing public information transparency, market efficiency and investor protection could suffer rather than benefit from it. Such consequence contradicts the purpose of information disclosure. On the other side, disclosure could enhance efficiency and investor protection by reducing private information asymmetry without changing public information. Therefore, disclosure policy should consider its effects on both private information asymmetry and public information transparency in maximizing efficiency and social welfare.
Learning of informed investors naturally arises from private information asymmetry. Its effects are, however, determined by private information quality and trading strategies. Insider learns from historical prices to analyze partially informed investor's private signal and trading strategies. On the other hand, she intentionally limits information revelation to restrain partially informed investor learning that helps him to improve subsequent trading.
Learning depends on information revelation but discourages it ex ante. A higher portion of partially informed investor's information comes from learning as his information precision deteriorates, although the absolute amount of information acquired declines because his learning capability decreases with his private information precision decreasing.
Our model is in the same spirit as those studying the profit-seeking motives of privately informed investors (see Kyle, 1985; Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Back et al., 2000; Dridi and Germain, 2009, among others) . A salient feature of our model is that it considers not only information discrepancy between informed and uninformed investors, but also information asymmetry between informed investors in a dynamic framework. Kyle (1985) studies monopolistic insider trading and its effects on market micro-structure. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) investigate perfectly competitive insiders' trading and market implications. Our model considers their models as two special polar cases and bridges them. In such sense, our model explains the stylized empirical patterns of trade clustering and price movements, while their models do not. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) develop discrete-and continuoustime models, respectively, to study the nature of competition among partially informed investors receiving private signals of homogeneous imprecision. In comparison, the novelty of our model resides on that heterogeneous information precision creates not only competition but also camouflage. Their time-varying dominance over each other dynamically shapes trading, prices, and market informational efficiency. Further, our model examines learning that naturally arises from private information asymmetry and interacts with competitive trading. More recently, Dridi and Germain (2009) develop a single-period trading model featuring informed investors endowed with noisy signals of differential precision. Our model extends theirs into a multiple-period framework to uncover the dynamic nature of trading and learning, and their joint effects on market micro-structure. Ostrovsky (2012) provides a theoretical foundation of information aggregation and revelation for strategic trading models, based on which we explore their policy implications on disclosure and welfare in the presence of private information asymmetry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium solution to the model. Section 4 analyzes the comparative statics of simulated results and policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a security market where trading takes place in discrete time n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
The market is cleared in period n = N . There are two assets in the market: one riskfree asset yields interest rate r = 0. One risky asset has a liquidation value of v ∼ N (v, σ 2 v ), where σ v is a proxy of public information in-transparency. All uncertainty is supported on a standard probability space (Ω, F, P ).
There are four types of risk-neutral agents: an insider, a partially informed investor, a market maker, and many noise traders. The market marker trades the risky asset on his own account and sets price competitively to clear the market. Market making is assumed to be a competitive profession, so the market maker's profit in each period n is expected to be zero. Before trading starts, the insider receives a precise private signal ϕ on the liquidation value v of the risky asset after period N , that is, ϕ = v. The partially informed investor receives a imprecise private signal on the liquidation value of the asset θ = v + ε, where ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ε ) and is independent of v. The insider and partially informed investor are informed investors who exploit their private information in competition. They know that their trading reveals information, exerting both transitory and permanent impact on prices.
Private information asymmetry refers to the information precision heterogeneity between the insider and partially informed investor, and is measured by the publicly known σ ε . The noise traders trade for non-informational reasons exogenous to the model. Their order flow, denoted by u n ∼ N (0, σ 2 u ), is independent of ϕ and θ. In each trading period n, the volumes of the market orders simultaneously submitted by the insider, partially informed investor and noise traders are denoted by x n , y n , and u n , respectively. The market maker does not know asset liquidation value v, and observes only the aggregate order flow Q n = x n + y n + u n . He sets asset price P n to clear the market.
Without loss of generality, we assume P 0 =v = 0. Let F n denote market information at time n, i.e., F n = σ{P i , i < n} for n ≥ 1, and F 0 = (Ω, Φ), where Φ denotes an empty set.
Since the orders of the noise traders are exogenous, we only need to consider the optimal actions of the informed investors and market maker. Thus, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium involves the trading strategies {x n , n = 1, 2, · · · , N } of the insider, the trading strategies {y n , n = 1, 2, · · · , N } of the partially informed investor, and a pricing rule {P n , n = 1, 2, · · · , N } of the market maker. The following conditions must be satisfied in forming an equilibrium:
1. The insider submits order flows x n to maximize the sum of her expected profits after periods n, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , conditional on her information in each period n, respectively:
2. The partially informed investor submits order flows y n to maximize the sum of his expected profits after period n, n = 1, 2, · · · , N , conditional on his information in each period n, respectively:
3. In each period n, the market maker sets asset price P n to clear the market, leading to expected profit of zero. The asset price in each period n satisfies
The above trading strategies and pricing rule can be expressed in functional forms as x n = X n (ϕ, P 1 , . . . , P n−1 ), y n = Y n (θ, P 1 , . . . , P n−1 ), and P n = P n (P 1 , . . . , P n−1 , Q n ), respectively.
The Model Solution
This section solves for the market equilibrium. One salient feature of our model is that informed investors are able to learn to improve information as trading proceeds. The insider and partially informed investor consider not only their own private information, but also information possessed by the other informed investor and the market maker. Without loss of generality, we assume the following linear order flow function for the insider:
where E(ṽ|ϕ, F n ) denotes the insider's expected asset value based on her private and market information. E(θ|ϕ, F n ) denotes her expectation of the partially informed investor' information. E(P n |ϕ, F n , x n ) denotes her expected asset price based on her private information, market information, and her order flow in period n. α n1 , α n2 , α n3 , α n4 denote the coefficients of these variables, respectively.
n−1 i=1 α n(i+4) P i denotes her application of information conveyed by historical prices. In the same logic, we assume the following linear order function for the partially informed investor:
where E(ṽ|θ, F n ) denotes the partially informed investor's expected asset value based on his private and market information. E(ϕ|θ, F n ) denotes his expectation of the insider' information based on his private and market information. E(P n |θ, F n , y n ) denotes his expected asset price based on his private information, market information, and his order flow in period n. β n1 , β n2 , β n3 , β n4 denote the coefficients of these variables, respectively. n−1 i=1 β n(i+4) P i denotes his use of information conveyed by historical prices.
It is known that E(ṽ|ϕ, F n ) ≡ ϕ and E(ṽ|θ, F n ) ≡ E(ϕ|θ, F n ). Given thatṽ,˜ , and u n , n = 1, 2, ..., N are jointly normally distributed, E(P n |ϕ, F n , x n ) and E(P n |θ, F n , y n ) can be expressed as the linear functions of ϕ, θ, P i , (i < n), x n , and y n , respectively. Thus, the above order flow functions of x n and y n can be rewritten as:
where τ n1 denotes the coefficient of the insider's endowed private information on her order flow in period n; τ ni denotes the coefficient of asset price in an early trading period i on her order flow in period n. ρ n1 denotes the coefficient of the partially informed investor's private signal on his order flow in period n; ρ ni denotes the coefficient of asset price in an early period i on his order flow in period n. Equations (4) and (5) capture the learning activities of informed investors through gathering and processing market information.
Following the same logic, the market maker's pricing rule can be expressed as:
where λ n denotes the coefficient of aggregate order flow in shaping asset price in period n. Market depth is defined as the reciprocal of λ n , capturing the informational efficiency of the market (Kyle, 1985; Biais et al., 2005; Pennacchi, 2007) . ξ ni denotes the weight assigned to asset price in an early period i in forming asset price in period n. Solving for the market equilibrium is equivalent to solving for {τ n1 , τ n2 , · · · , τ nn , n = 1, · · · , N } for the insider, {ρ n1 , ρ n2 , · · · , ρ nn , n = 1, · · · , N } for the partially informed investor, and {λ n , ξ n1 , ξ n2 , · · · , ξ nn−1 , n = 1, · · · , N } for the market maker by satisfying the equilibrium conditions outlined in Equations (1), (2) and (3).
For illustration purpose, we study a two-period case with N = 2. 3 We compute the values of the following parameters: {τ 11 , τ 21 , τ 22 }, {ρ 11 , ρ 21 , ρ 22 , }, and {λ 1 , λ 2 , ξ 21 } using backward induction algorithm. (See Appendix for details.) The three parameters specifying the market maker's pricing rules in periods 1 and 2 are:
where λ 1 and λ 2 capture how much price information is derived from the aggregate order flows in periods 1 and 2, respectively. ξ 21 denotes the coefficient of period 1 asset price P 1 on period 2 asset price. Since P 1 is an outcome of market equilibrium, it incorporates private information revealed to the market in period 1. E is given by:
and F is given by:
For the insider' order flow in period 2, we solve for
where τ 21 is the coefficient of the insider's private information on her order flow in period 2.
Parameter τ 22 is the coefficient of period 1 asset price P 1 on her order flow in period 2. For the partially informed investor' order flow in period 2, we solve for
where ρ 21 and ρ 22 are the coefficients of the partially informed investor's private information and asset price in period 1, respectively. We also solve for τ 11 and ρ 11 , respectively:
where τ 11 is the coefficient of the insider's private information on her order flow in period 1. ρ 11 is the coefficient of the partially informed investor's private information on his order flow in period 1.
Result Analysis
This section first demonstrates the uniqueness of market equilibrium, followed by analyzing informed investors' trading in the presence of private information asymmetry. It shows that insider's trading strategies are different from those of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) and perfectly competitive insiders in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) . Information acquisition through learning is subject to private information asymmetry, and discourages information revelation ex ante. The dominance of the competition effect or the camouflage effect of partially informed trading shapes market efficiency time-varyingly and situationdependently.
Unique Linear Market Equilibrium
In a discrete framework, the existence of a unique linear market equilibrium can be demonstrated numerically. The equilibrium convergence conditions are that the difference between two adjacent numerical solutions is less than 10 −5 , and that the coefficients of aggregate orders on asset price in periods 1 and 2 must satisfy λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 > 0.
We illustrate the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in two steps. In the first step, the exogenous variable values are fixed at σ v = 1, σ ε = 1, and σ u = 1. We adapt our model with different initial values of the nine parameters λ 1 , λ 2 , ξ 21 , τ 11 , τ 21 , τ 22 , ρ 11 , ρ 21 , and ρ 22 in an extensive range of -100 to 100, respectively. We report the numerical results of Table 1 . It shows that all converged solutions yield the same result with widely ranged initial values of λ 1 , suggesting that the interaction of the agents establishes a unique linear market equilibrium.
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In the second step, we examine whether market equilibrium uniqueness is general and Table 2 shows that the numerical calculations generate unique market equilibria for an extensive combination of exogenous parameter values, confirming that the market equilibrium is unique.
Competitive Trading
Before examining the dynamic perspective of trading strategies adopted by informed investors, we first set out the background with an analysis of the expected profits of insider and partially informed investor in competition. In particular, we investigate how their profit share-out changes with respect to information asymmetry between insider and partially informed investor and asset value variance, respectively.
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As reported in Table 3 , the insider's expected profit in periods 1 and 2 increases with private information asymmetry σ as in Kyle (1985) . The partially informed investor's expected profit in periods 1 and 2 increases with asset value variance increasing, because his informational advantage over the market maker grows. But his expected profit decreases as private information asymmetry increases, that is, his private information becomes more inferior to the insider's. The results are consistent with the semi-strong market efficiency feature that private information generates extra trading profits. Table 4 reports the profit share-out between insider and partially informed investor with respect to private information asymmetry and asset value variance, respectively. Profit share-out is measured by the ratio of the partially informed investor's total expected profit to the insider's total expected profit. It is intuitive that the insider extracts higher portion of profit as she possesses greater informational advantage over the partially informed investors.
The insider's share of profit decreases as asset value variance increases. Asset value variance has two opposite effects on the insider's expected profit. On the one hand, it increases the value of private information and, consequently, the expected profit of informed investors. On the other hand, it dilutes the insider's informational advantage over the partially informed investor eroding her share of profit. Only the second effect plays a role in profit share-out.
We find that profit share-out between insider and partially informed investor is fixed when the ratio of σ 2 ε to σ 2 v is fixed. Given that profit share-out is a direct outcome of competitive trading, private information asymmetry and asset value variance tend to jointly shape informed investors' trading strategies. Asset value variance reversely captures public information transparency. The result implies that the impact of private information asymmetry is subject to public information transparency. We therefore mainly use the ratio of σ 2 ε to σ 2 v as public information transparency adjusted private information asymmetry between insider and partially informed investor in our subsequent investigation.
Order flows and expected profits of the informed investors in different trading periods capture the dynamic nature of their strategic trading and asymmetric competition. It shows in Figure 1 that the partially informed investor's expected profit in period 1 decreases convexly with private information asymmetry increasing, although his order flow does not exhibit a monotonically decreasing pattern. The partially informed investor increases his order flow when private information asymmetry starts increasing from zero-he becomes slightly less competitive than the insider. In this situation, it is optimal for him to trade aggressively as he possesses only marginally inferior private information than the insider. Otherwise, he may quickly lose his informational advantage over the market maker as the insider trades and reveals information. However, when private information asymmetry rises above a certain degree, the partially informed investor switches to decrease his order flow as the precision of his private information further deteriorates.
The insider first reduces her order flow when information asymmetry starts increasing from zero. Her action may look counter-intuitive at the first glance, but indeed reflects the optimal strategy that trades off profit gain due to active trading versus profit loss due to information revelation in the current period, and profiting in the current period versus profit-ing in the later period. When the partially informed investor is informationally competitive, the insider intentionally reduces her order flow because the benefit of preserving information outweighs the profit derived from head-to-head competition in an early trading period. Her expected profit increases with less order flow nevertheless, confirming the rationality and optimality of the insider's trading strategy.
However, when private information asymmetry increases beyond a certain degree, the insider alters her strategy to trade more aggressively as information asymmetry further increases. In this situation, partially informed trading provides rising camouflage accompanied by fading competition. The increase in the insider's order flow gradually slows down as private information asymmetry approaches infinity. The partially informed investor reduces his order flow and is eventually driven out of market. The insider's trading strategy and expected profit then converge to those of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) , where no partially informed investor is considered.
When private information asymmetry rises slightly above zero, the partially informed investor has more order flow than the insider, but generates less expected profit than the latter.
The partially informed investor's expected profit in period 1 is computed as y 1 (ṽ − P 1 ). Per order profitṽ − P 1 is negatively correlated to order flow y 1 because more informed buying order drives up asset price and in turn reduces profit. The partially informed investor has lower expected profit than the insider since the latter could more accurately calculate her order flow. As shown in Figure 2 , the insider's order flow increases monotonically in period 2 when she possesses stronger informational advantage over the partially informed investor.
Since trading ends after period 2, the insider is no longer concerned over that information revelation affects subsequent trading. Her trading strategy becomes completely driven by the current profit.
Consistently, the partially informed investor's order flow and expected profit in period 2 decrease more dramatically than in period 1 when private information asymmetry enlarges.
As his private information becomes less precise, the partially informed investor relies more on market information derived from historical asset price. So his expected asset value based on information conveyed by historical price falls closer to the latter, reducing expected profit and trading incentive. When the partially informed investor's information is significantly imprecise, he almost stops trading. His expected profit in period 2 displays a convex-shape decreasing pattern with respect to private information asymmetry.
The finding explains the U-shaped patterns of intraday stock trading volume (Jain and Joh, 1988; Chan et al., 1996) , mean return and volatility (Harris, 1986; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997) (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987, 1991) .
If the informed investors design their optimal trading strategies based on their asymmetric private information, how do they allocate expected profit between trading periods?
Graph A in Figure 3 shows that the ratio of the insider's expected profit in period 1 to her expected profit in period 2 changes non-monotonically with respect to private information asymmetry. The insider extracts the highest proportion of profit in period 1 when she possesses information of identical precision as the partially informed investor, consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back et al. (2000) in that competition between investors endowed with similar signals is more intense in early stages. The insider sharply reduces her proportion of profit in period 1 as the partially informed investor's information becomes slightly less precise. She rationally sacrifices some period 1 profit in exchange for greater period 2 profit when the partially informed investor imposes stiff competition. The insider shifts to increase the proportion of early profit after the partially informed investor's infor-mation precision declines below a certain degree. It becomes optimal to increase order flow to profit more in period 1 than to preserve information. Her profit allocation across trading periods converges to that of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) as private information asymmetry enlarges (σ → ∞).
Graph B in Figure 3 shows that the ratio of the partially informed investor's expected profit in period 1 to his expected profit in period 2 increases concavely as private information asymmetry increases. He allocates a greater portion of profit to the early period when his private information becomes less precise, although the absolute level of his expected profit in period 1 decreases with private information asymmetry increasing. In period 2, the partially informed investor's informational advantage over the market maker will decline since the latter acquires asset value information from trading in period 1. Waiting leads to less profit, so it is optimal to allocate a greater portion of profit to the early trading period.
Endogenous Learning
A salient feature of our model is that informed investors learn about the other parties' information conveyed by prices and incorporate learned information in subsequent trading. Interesting questions arise: how does private information asymmetry affect informed investors' learning incentives? How does learning interact with trading and information revelation?
This section addresses these questions. Table 2 shows that learning does not help the insider to improve her information. In period 2, the insider assigns the same absolute weights to her private information and the market information in deciding her order flow. τ 21 and τ 22 have identical values but opposite signs, suggesting that they perfectly substitute each other. The market is semi-strong informationally efficient as the market maker sets asset price equal to the expected asset value based on the market information. The result confirms Kyle (1985) 's intuition of modeling an insider's trading strategy as a linear function of the difference between her private information and information conveyed by current price. The insider uses less of her private information in period 1 than in period 2, that is, τ 21 is greater than τ 11 . The result suggests that the insider strategically delays information revelation to restrict learning of the partially informed investor, beside to hamper price discovery.
Learning however helps the partially informed investor to acquire useful market information as trading proceeds. The partially informed investor's application of total information in trading is measured by the sum of the absolute coefficients of his private information and the market information. Figure 4 shows that his informational trading decreases convexly as private information asymmetry enlarges. In period 1, his application of private information decreases sharply as information asymmetry increases. The coefficient of market information first increases as learning substantially improves the partially informed investor's information. It then decreases as his capability to infer market information decreases with the precision of his private information decreasing. When private information asymmetry is high, the partially informed investor almost completely relies on the market information.
The same pattern is also observed in period 2. His market information usage is relatively higher in period 2 because he acquires price information at the end of period 1. The result suggests that investors improve subsequent trading with technical analysis of historical price and trading information (Treynor and Ferguson, 1985; Grundy and McNichols, 1989; Brown and Jennings, 1989; He and Wang, 1995) . The result is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis in that only privately informed investors can earn extra profits in a semi-strong informationally efficient market. Technical analysis leads to greater profit. The magnitude of increase in profit depends on the investor's private information quality.
Learning affects trading and market efficiency from the dynamic perspective. On the one hand, it improves market efficiency by encouraging informational trading. On the other hand, it discourages ex ante information revelation, which negatively affects market efficiency. The net learning effect is endogenously determined by private information asymmetry induced strategic trading. Table 2 shows that the market maker assigns greater weight on aggregate order flow in pricing when asset value variance increases-private information revealed in trading becomes more valuable. He assigns relatively a lower weight on aggregate order flow in period 2 because he partially discovers the asset fundamental value in period 1. Figure 5 shows that the amount of information revealed to the market maker decreases as private information asymmetry increases. Previous studies also find that information is revealed more quickly in the presence of stronger competition between informed investors (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1996; Back et al., 2000) . The dynamic is however more complex here. In the current model, partially informed trading not only exerts weaker competition, but also produces more camouflage when private information asymmetry increases.
Market Depth
Market depth reflects the sensitiveness of change in asset price in response to change in order flow. The market depth is deeper when informed trading has a weaker impact on price movement. Since the market is semi-strong informationally efficient, the market depth reflects both the amount and quality of private information revealed in trading. Figure 6 shows that in period 1, the market depth first increases and then switches to decrease with private information asymmetry increasing. When information asymmetry starts increasing from zero, the insider withholds private information as the partially informed investor trades aggressively in competing for profit. The negative effect of noisy information produced by partially informed trading on price discovery outweighs the positive effect of clean information revealed by insider trading. The market depth rises. When private information asymmetry increases beyond a certain degree, the insider reverts to trade aggressively, revealing more private information. The partially informed investor gradually loses his influence on price formation with less trades. The market depth gradually reverts its course to decrease. So the market depth in period 1 will first rise above the level of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) and then decrease as private information asymmetry further increases, driven by the trade-off between the competition effect and the camouflage effect of partially informed trading.
In period 2, the market depth decreases monotonically with private information asymmetry increasing. The insider trades to take full advantage of her informational superiority, increasing the amount of clean information revealed to the market. Price formation becomes more sensitive to order flow. The influence of private information asymmetry on market depth changes in trading stages, depending on the amount and quality of private information revealed in the asymmetric competition between the informed investors. The results suggest that partially informed investor's trading in a semi-strong informationally efficient market does not necessarily improve market informational efficiency for certain. The results also imply that per unit increase in stock return and volatility at market opening is accompanied by greater increase in trading volume than at market closure.
Noise Trading
The noise traders trade for non-informational reasons exogenous to the model. This section examines how noise trading affects the informed trading and learning and market microstructure. Table 5 shows that the sum of order flows and expected profits of the insider and partially informed investor increase in proportion to the magnitude of noise trading σ u in both periods 1 and 2. The magnitude of noise trading negatively affects price discovery, creating more profitable opportunities for informational trading. However, the magnitude of noise trading does no affect the allocation of the order flows and expected profits of the informed investors among trading periods, neither the profit share-out between them.
The informed investors adjust their trading strategies according to changes in noise trading.
Thus, noise trading does not alter the nature of competition between the informed investors. Table 6 shows that the market depth increases with the magnitude of noise trading in proportion to σ u in both periods, ceteris paribus. Noise trading hampers price discovery, reducing the sensitivity of price adjustment to order flow. However, price discovery of the market maker will not be affected by noise trading in equilibrium, because the informed investors adjust their order flows according to change in the magnitude of noise trading in order to maintain optimal information revelation in equilibrium. As a result, learning of the partially informed investor does not change with the magnitude of noise trading either.
The results imply that noise trading does not affect the nature of information revelation and learning.
Policy Implications
Profit of the informed investors comes at the expense of the noise traders. Private information asymmetry affects non-monotonically their profit. Figure 7 shows that the total expected profit of the informed investors first decreases with private information asymmetry when it starts increasing from zero. In this situation, the partially informed investor's profitability decreases as his information precision deteriorates, while the insider does not realize full profit as she preserves information. Their total expected profit falls below a level of perfectly competitive insiders in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) . The total expected profit of the informed investors reverts to increase as private information asymmetry further increases. The insider's expected profit rapidly increases as the partially informed investor becomes less informationally competitive and his trading provides camouflage. However, their total expected profit never exceeds the expected profit of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) .
There exists a non-zero degree of private information asymmetry between informed investors that leads to the least amount of value extraction by privately informed investors from uninformed investors.
The results have important policy implications for information disclosure (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000; Fishman and Hagerty, 2003) and investor protection. The impact of private information asymmetry is subject to asset return variance, which is a proxy for public information transparency. If disclosure only reduces asset return variance, but does not change information asymmetry between informed investors, the influence of private information asymmetry increases rather than decreases with greater disclosure. That could cause unintended deterioration in market efficiency and protection to uninformed investors, contradicting the purpose of disclosure. On the other side, disclosure could enhance efficiency and protection by reducing private information asymmetry without changing public information.
Therefore, disclosure policy should be simultaneously targeted to both public information transparency and private information asymmetry in optimizing efficiency and welfare.
Conclusions
It is known that investors possessing private information of heterogeneous precision coexist in financial markets. They also rationally learn to enhance their information as trading proceeds. Therefore, we in this paper investigate how such private information asymmetry affects trading and learning behaviors in the presence of profit competition, and illustrate their externalities to market micro-structure and implications on disclosure policy.
We find that information asymmetry between informed investors significantly affects price formation, information revelation, and market efficiency. Insider displays a time-varying and situation-dependent trading pattern that is more complicated than those of monopolistic insider in Kyle (1985) and perfectly competitive insiders in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) .
Our model explains the stylized asymmetric U-shape patterns of intraday stock trading volume, return, and volatility from a strategic trading perspective. It implies that market depth rises at market opening but decreases at market closure with private information asymmetry increasing. A non-zero degree of private information asymmetry leads to maximal market efficiency by forcing informed investors to trade off competition aggressiveness versus information preservation. The effects of private information asymmetry are subject to public information transparency. Therefore, it is important for disclosure policy to consider its effects on both private information asymmetry and public information transparency in optimizing efficiency and investor protection.
Our work constitutes one of the first efforts to introduce asymmetrically informed investors and endogenous learning into a dynamic trading framework. Our discrete model by and large illustrates the nature of time-varying impact of private information asymmetry on trading, learning, and market efficiency. Its caveat is not able to identify the continuous patterns of these effects. Such limitation, however, leads to an interesting avenue in which to extend the current work by going continuous-time. A continuous-time model would also allow us to better quantify the effects of private information asymmetry between informed investors.
A Appendix

A.1
We illustrate how to calculate the order flows of the insider and partially informed investor, and the market price set by the market maker. We first give the following lemma:
and the conditional variance is
It is assumed that ϕ = v, θ = v + ε and that v and ε are mutually independent with means of zero and variances of σ 2 v and σ 2 ε , respectively. Hence, we know that the joint distribution of ϕ and θ is
We have the following propositions: Proposition A1. For the insider in period 1:
For the partially informed investor in period 1:
For the market maker, the information observed in period 1 is Q 1 = τ 11 ϕ + ρ 11 θ + u 1 = (τ 11 + ρ 11 ) v + ρ 11 ε + u 1 . Hence, the joint distribution of v and Q 1 can be expressed as
Proposition A2: For the market maker,
According to the semi-strong form market efficiency conditions in Eq.s (3) and (6), we have
In period 2, by previous assumptions, we have asset price in period 1 as
The joint distribution of
We then have
For the insider, we have (A.5) and for the partially informed investor, we have
The market maker's information comes from aggregate order flow, so he knows P 1 and Q 2 = x 2 + y 2 + u 2 , where
Further, we have
where
and
According to the semi-strong form market efficiency conditions in Eq.s (3) and (6), we compute
A.2
We present solutions to market equilibrium. Based on the market equilibrium conditions in Eq.s (1) and (2), we obtain equilibrium solution using back-ward induction algorithm. Starting in period 2, we know P 2 = λ 2 (x 2 + y 2 + u 2 ) + ξ 21 P 1 . The insider's expected profit can be expressed as
To maximize her expected profit, we solve the first order condition as
We solve for the insider's order flow in period 2:
Plugging (A.5) into the above equation and using Eq. (4) , we have
, (A.10)
Similarly, for the partially informed investor in period 2, we have
The first order condition is:
Solving it for the order flow of the partially informed investor in period 2:
Plugging (A.6) into the above equation and using equation (5), we have
, (A.12)
After obtaining period 2 solutions, we solve for the period 1 variable values . The insider's expected profit in period 1 is
The first order condition is
which can be written as
Solving the equation yields
Similarly, the partially informed investor's expected profit function in period 1 is
Solving the equation yields This table shows the existence of unique market equilibrium with initial values of asset value variance σ 2 v , private information asymmetry σ 2 ε , and magnitude of noise trading σ 2 u changing in a range of 0.10 to 100, respectively. The equilibrium convergence condition requires that the difference between two adjacent solutions is less than 10 −5 . Some calculations do not converge when λ 1 or λ 2 falls out of reasonable ranges during the numerical process. The Difference column reports the difference between two adjacent solutions when calculation converges. The Indicator column reports 1 for convergence, 0 otherwise. λ 1 denotes the coefficient of aggregate order flow on market price in period 1. λ 2 and ξ 21 denote the coefficients of aggregate order flow in period 2 and asset price in period 1, respectively, on asset price in period 2. τ 11 denotes the coefficient of insider's private information on her order flow in period 1. τ 21 and τ 22 denote the coefficients of insider's private information and the market information, respectively, on her order flow in period 2. ρ 11 denote the coefficient of partially informed investor's private information on his order flow in period 1. ρ 21 and ρ 22 denote the coefficients of partially informed investor's private information and the market information, respectively, on his order flow in period 2. This table reports profit share-out between the insider and partially informed investor with respect to private information asymmetry and asset value variance, respectively. Profit share-out is measured by the ratio of the expected profit of partially informed investor in periods 1 and 2 to the expected profit of insider in periods 1 and 2 in percentage point. Asset value variance σ 2 v changes column-wise in a range of 1 to 10. Private information asymmetry σ 2 ε changes row-wise in a range of 0 to 9. Magnitude of noise trading σ 2 u is normalized to be 1. This figure depicts profit allocation of insider and partially informed investor between periods 1 and 2 with respect to private information asymmetry σ 2 ε . Profit allocation is measured by the ratio of investor's expected profit in period 1 to expected profit in period 2. Asset value variance σ 2 v and magnitude of noise trading σ 2 u are normalized to be 1. 
